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Abstract 
This paper investigates bank-borrower relationships in an advanced transition country. The empirical analysis 
is based on a unique dataset of 121 privatized small and medium-sized Slovenian corporations in the first years 
following the end of the banking sector’s reorganization (1998–2002). The results reveal the strong dominance 
of bank funding for small and medium-sized enterprises. Despite this, the firms included in the study are 
characterized by a small number of bank relationships. The specifics of the transition are moreover reflected in 
the substantial role of fixed assets that can be put up as collateral. However, the number of bank relationships 
relates to similar factors that have been proven to influence the number of firm-bank relationships in developed 
countries. We thus expect that the number of bank relationships in Slovenia will increase with the progress of 
restructuring and privatization of the enterprise sector and with the integration of financial markets following 
Slovenia’s entry to the European Union.  
 
JEL: G32, G21 
 
1. Introduction 
 
Several factors underpin the reasoning of the importance of banks in firm financing. The variety of 
services banks provide to enterprises enables them better access to information about firms. As a 
result, banks have a comparative advantage in screening projects and monitoring clients and in 
mitigating moral hazard and asymmetric information problems. In particular, banks might be better 
than markets in providing finance to de novo or smaller firms with no reputation. They may be more 
inclined to bargain and prevent inefficient liquidations and can rely on alternative mechanisms to 
boost the efficiency of investment allocations, such as credit rationing and collateral (Feldman and 
Wagner, 2002). For several reasons, all of these factors acquire further importance in transition 
economies. The transition to a market economy requires the extensive restructuring of the corporate 
sector and the constitution of de novo firms with the corresponding re-allocation of funds to more 
productive sectors. Given the limited development of capital markets and limited alternative sources of 
financing1 firms in transition economies mostly depend on local banks. This provides the latter with 
relatively strong bargaining power and, consequently, the potential to extract rents through excessive 
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loan pricing (the hold-up problem). This could particularly be the case in highly concentrated banking 
sectors with a few dominant local banks, which is often the case in transition countries.2 One way in 
which firms may avoid the hold-up problem is by building relationships with more than one bank 
(Rajan, 1992). We would thus expect firms in transition countries to have several bank relationships. 
However, the average number of bank relationships in the region is relatively small. Ongena and 
Smith (2000), for instance, report that Polish firms on average do business with 3.3 banks, while the 
number of bank relationships is only slightly higher in Hungary (4). This certainly raises doubts about 
the ability of firms in transition to rely on new banks and hence about firm capacity to avoid the hold-
up problem and reduce their financing costs. Firms’ access to bank financing in fact also depends on 
the institutional environment in which the firms and banks operate. In reality, despite firms’ strong 
demand for financial funds the transition-related shocks to the economic environment and the financial 
system have largely hampered the financial inflows to these firms.3 It is thus the aim of the paper to 
explore whether the relative underdevelopment of the financial system, poor enforcement of both 
shareholder and creditor rights and other inefficiencies in the regulatory and legal environment 
somehow hinder firms from reaching the ‘optimal’ level of bank relationships. This, in turn, would 
normally reflect a firm’s optimization of the costs and benefits of creating multiple bank relationships. 
 
More precisely, our study focuses on the characteristics of bank financing for small and medium-sized 
firms in Slovenia, an advanced transition country. The sample and period of our analysis is interesting 
for various reasons. First, we focus on the initial years following the reorganization of the Slovenian 
banking sector.4 Although the banks began operating like normal corporations, they still shared some 
specifics in their behaviour and business environment that could have distorted their lending 
behaviour. They mostly lacked experience in ‘traditional’ lending activity and credit evaluation5. 
Moreover, at least initially the restructuring of the banking sector, limited entrance of foreign banks 
and domination of the two state-owned banks very likely introduced further distortions and obstacles 
to the banking sector’s lending capacity. Second, our analysis studies the characteristics of firm-bank 
relationships on a sample of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs). Although these enterprises 
dominate the Slovenian economy6 they fit perfectly with the purpose of our study. In fact, SMEs may 
in particular be subject to the hold-up problem. They are most often too small to access the stock 
market and are characterized by greater opaqueness and information asymmetry than larger firms. 
Moreover, while the concentration of banking sectors and increasing integration of financial markets 
favour large companies, they make SMEs’ access to bank loans more difficult.7  On the other hand, 
regulatory limitations of foreign investments have largely limited the inflow of foreign funds8 to the 
economy while the poor investor protection has mostly prevented the capital market from functioning, 
making bank financing almost the only source of financing available to Slovenian SMEs.  
 
The results of our study show that the access to and costs of bank financing represented the main 
factors determining firm investments and growth in the period of our analysis. We further find that 
these firms valued their relationships with domestic banks highly, while on average less importance 
was attributed to outside equity investors and foreign banks. Notwithstanding the banks’ importance, 
the number of firm-bank relationships was relatively small. The firms on average borrowed from two 
banks with the main bank providing them with more than one-half of their total loans. However, our 
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empirical findings show that, despite the peculiarities associated with a financial system in transition, 
the number of bank relationships relate to similar factors that determine multiple bank relationships in 
developed countries. On average, the number of bank relationships in the 1998-2002 period increased 
with firm size, the dependence of firms on bank financing and their influence on firm decision-
making. Unlike other studies that proxy the importance of banks with selected financial ratios, we 
directly address firm management and measure their perception of the banks’ role and importance of 
bank financing. Also consistent with the theoretical predictions is the negative impact of firm 
reputation (age) and bank board representation on the number of bank relationships. Again in line with 
expectations, poorly performing firms found it harder to build new links with banks. In addition, we 
find empirical confirmation of some weaknesses of transition banking: the significant positive impact 
of the size of the fixed assets on the number of bank relationships confirms the general observation 
about prudential bank lending and the relevance of guarantees in determining firms’ access to credit in 
transition. Further, the limited role that the firms attributed to foreign bank financing reflects another 
feature of the transition, namely the monopoly power of the main local bank(s), inherited from the pre-
transition period. We thus expect to observe more bank relationships in the future in relation to 
Slovenia’s accession to the European Union (2004) and improvements made to corporate governance 
practice, the transparency and regulation of both the financial and non-financial sectors and the 
growing financial sector competition following Slovenian integration with European financial 
markets.  
 
The paper is structured as follows. The second chapter provides a short description of the banking 
sector and the characteristics of small and medium-sized enterprises in Slovenia. The third chapter sets 
out the main theoretical and empirical findings explaining the emergence of firm-bank relationships. 
The empirical analysis of firms’ access and decisions to create multiple bank relationships is presented 
in the fourth section. The last section concludes. 
 
2. Aggregate data on banking sector exposure to the corporate sector in Slovenia 
 
The analysis of the determinant of bank relationships in Slovenia relies on a sample of 121 small and 
medium-sized enterprises9 in the 1998-2002 period. As evidenced in Table 1 below, these firms 
financed most of their investments through internally generated funds (amortization and retained 
earnings), while bank loans represented a limited yet still the most important source of outside 
financing. In the period of our concern, we observe the growing importance of long-term financing, 
and nearly no reliance on equity or bond financing. 
 
These data receive confirmation in the findings of Volz (2004) based on the 2002 Business 
Environment and Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) implemented jointly by the EBRD and the 
World Bank. The survey covers 6,153 firms in 26 transition countries (including Slovenia). Volz 
(2004) reports similar observations to ours:  internal funds constitute 39.20 (50.80) percent of new 
investments in medium (small) firms, while borrowing from banks provides 16.4 percent (10.5 
percent). Equity issues and other sources of financing are negligible (below 1%), while foreign banks 
provide 2.8% of funding in medium firms and 0.97% in small firms. A similar picture emerges when 
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observing aggregate statistics at the country level. Bonds are mostly issued by banks (3% of GPD in 
2004) and the government (17.8% of GDP). Corporate bonds, on the other hand, represent less than 
1% of GDP in 2004 (Bank of Slovenia, 2005).  
 
Table 1: Percentage of total additional firms’ investments financed by different sources of financing for 121 
small and medium-sized firms 
 1998 
Mean 
(Median) 
1999 
Mean 
(Median) 
2000 
Mean 
(Median) 
2001 
Mean 
(Median) 
2002 
Mean 
(Median) 
New issued shares 0.46 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Retained earnings 13.63 
(0.00) 
14.86 
(0.00) 
15.67 
(0.00) 
15.91 
(0.00) 
16.63 
(0.00) 
New issued bonds 0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
0.00 
(0.00) 
Bank debt: long-term 5.52 
(0.00) 
10.16 
(0.00) 
10.49 
(0.00) 
11.41 
(0.00) 
12.83 
(0.00) 
Bank debt: short-term 3.31 
(0.00) 
4.14 
(0.00) 
6.86 
(0.00) 
5.75 
(0.00) 
5.47 
(0.00) 
Amortization 59.46 
(70.00) 
55.01 
(59.00) 
52.03 
(50.00) 
52.62 
(50.00) 
54.23 
(51.50) 
Other sources 5.73 
(0.00) 
6.20 
(0.00) 
5.42 
(0.00) 
8.62 
(0.00) 
6.71 
(0.00) 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
The importance of bank financing is further explored on the basis of questionnaires. We asked the 
firms to evaluate the importance of different characteristics related to the financial sector for their 
investments and growth (1-not important; 5-very important). The descriptive statistics reflecting firms’ 
perceptions of the importance of selected factors are presented in Table 2 below. As shown in the 
table, the costs of bank financing represent the most important factor influencing firm investments and 
growth. Also, half the firms attributed a high level of importance to their relationships with domestic 
banks. On the other hand, foreign bank loans and external investor capital mattered less. The required 
documentation and, in particular, potential lack of professionalism or corruption of bank employees 
when assigning loans also does not represent an important factor for SME financing in Slovenia. 
 
Table 2: Importance of financial sector variables for firm operations and growth 
 Mean (sd) Median Min Max 
High interest rates 4.14 
(1.14) 
5.00 1.00 5.00 
Access to bank financing 3.43 
(1.24) 
4.00 1.00 5.00 
Required loan documentation 2.97 
(1.20) 
3.00 1.00 5.00 
Access to loan information 3.17 
(1.30) 
3.00 1.00 5.00 
Relationships with banks 3.73 
(1.19) 
4.00 1.00 5.00 
Lack of professionalism of bank 
employees 
1.53 
(0.99) 
1.00 1.00 5.00 
Access to foreign bank financing 2.67 
(1.28) 
3.00 1.00 5.00 
External investor capital 2.67 
(1.38) 
3.00 1.00 5.00 
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Source: Authors’ calculations. 
 
Credit relationships were also the primary reasons for the existence of firm-bank relationships in 
Slovenia. For the period of our analysis, Gregoric (2003) reports that banks rarely held significant 
ownership blocks directly but, if present, participated in firm ownership indirectly through bank-
founded investment funds. Consistent with the latter observation is the average percentage of shares 
owned by the banks in the firms in our sample, which amounted to just 1.06 (median share=0). The 
limited involvement of banks in firm equity also receives confirmation in the aggregate data. In the 
period of our analysis, the total equity holdings of banks did not exceed 0.5% (see Table 3). Slightly 
higher was bank participation in issues of other debt-like corporate securities (i.e. bonds). Loans, 
however, represented by far the most important bank claim on the corporate sector. Although they 
have been increasing over the last few years, in 2002 the share of bank loans in GDP was still 
substantially lower than in the Euro area countries.  
 
Table 3: Banking sector claims on the corporate sector in Slovenia, as a % of GDP for the 2000 – 2004 period 
(GDP in million EUR) 
As % of GDP and in mill. EUR 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
GDP in million EUR 17,222 18,490 20,105 21,507 23,080 
Corporate loans 20.7% 22.7% 23.5% 26.1% 25.7% 
Corporate securities 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.4% 1.9% 
Equity holdings 0.5% 0.5% 0.4% 0.4% 0.3% 
Total claims to corporate sector 22.6% 24.5% 25.4% 27.9% 27.9% 
Source: Bank of Slovenia (2005) 
 
Given the importance of bank financing for Slovenian small and medium-sized enterprises, the limited 
role of share capital, limitations on single bank exposures10 and inefficiencies in the institutional 
environment, we would expect multiple bank relationships to be quite common in Slovenia. However, 
as evidenced in Table 4 below the average number of bank relationships in 1998-2002 resembled that 
seen in the most developed European countries. This seems to be the case despite the fact that bank 
financing actually represented the main source of outside firm financing in Slovenia and despite the 
weaknesses in the institutional environment (i.e. insufficient creditor protection).11 On average, firms 
borrowed from three banks, while half the firms did not borrow from more than two banks. A similar 
number have been reported for Norway (2.3), Sweden (2.5), the United Kingdom (2.9), namely all 
countries with functioning legal systems and a variety of alternative financing sources (i.e. large 
families in the Scandinavian countries, capital market and venture capital in the UK).12  
 
Table 4: Frequency distribution of bank lending relationships for 121 small and medium-sized Slovenian firms 
 Number 
of firms 
Percentage 
of firms 
One bank relationship 37 30.58 
Two bank relationships 43 35.54 
Three bank relationships 26 21.49 
Four bank relationships 6 4.96 
More than four bank 
relationships 
9 7.44 
Total 121 100.00 
Source: Authors’ calculations. 
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Most of the firms relied on one large bank; on average, the single largest bank provided 67.87 percent 
of the entire bank financing for the firms in our sample, while for half the firms this percentage 
exceeded 70 percent. We find that the percentage of loans provided by the main bank is negatively 
related to the number of firm-bank relationships (corr.=-0.55, sign=0.00). The observed dominance in 
loan provision by one main bank implies that relationship lending is an important lending technology13 
in Slovenia. This privileged bank-borrower relationship may provide the banks with strong relative 
bargaining power and, consequently, the potential to extract rents at the cost of firms and their 
shareholders (or other stakeholders). This may particularly be the case in highly concentrated sectors 
where the ‘incumbent’ powerful banks may limit firms’ access to smaller banks and further aggravate 
the hold-up problem.  
 
The Slovenian banking sector can be in fact considered a highly concentrated market. This is clearly 
illustrated in Table 5. Based on total assets, the data on concentration coefficients CC5 and CC3 show 
that in the period of our analysis the five largest banks in the country held more than a two-thirds 
market share. Even more indicative is the fact that the three largest banks controlled more than one-
half of the market. Concentration rates in the loan market are somewhat different. The market share of 
the three largest banks in the country, measured by loans to non-banking firms, was lower (around 
50%) than the market share measured by total assets in the entire period under observation. It is 
possible to observe a similar pattern of the market shares of the five largest banks in country, meaning 
that smaller banks managed to compete with their larger competitors as concerns credit operations.  
 
Table 5: Market structure data for the Slovenian banking sector 
 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
Proportion of foreign owned banks 13.0% 20.0% 21.4% 20.8% 27.3%
Market share of foreign owned banks 4.9% 4.8% 15.3% 15.2% 16.9%
Market share of state owned banks 41.3% 41.7% 42.5% 48.9% 13.3%
Market concentration (CC5 - total assets) 63.2% 63.4% 59.5% 66.3% 67.2%
Market concentration (CC3 - total assets) 51.7% 51.4% 46.7% 53.6% 55.4%
Market concentration (CC5 - loans to non-banks) --- --- 60.0% 66.2% 67.1%
Market concentration (CC3 - loans to non-banks) --- --- 43.4% 51.1% 52.9%
Source: EBRD Transition Report (several issues), Bank of Slovenia (2005) 
 
How then has all of this influenced the number of bank relationships in the first years of the 
‘advanced’ Slovenian transition? To what extent were Slovenian banks capable of preserving their 
privileged relationship with SMEs and extract rents for their benefit? How much did the specifics of 
the transition and underdevelopment of the financial sector in general prevent firms from creating 
links with new banks and avoiding the potential hold-up problem? Several theoretical assumptions and 
empirical evidence discuss the influence of firm- and industry-specific factors on the costs and 
benefits of multiple bank relationships and, consequently, determine their ‘optimal’ value. Our aim is 
thus to explore whether the specifics of the banking sector in a transition country (e.g. court delays in 
enforcing contracts; high concentration of the banking sector; state-ownership; delays in firm 
restructuring and privatization) have somehow distorted the effects of any of the mentioned factors on 
the number of bank relationships. 
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3. Theoretical and empirical explanations of the number of bank relationships 
 
By lending to enterprises banks acquire important information that is not available to others (firms’ 
prior projects, liquidity, future intentions etc.). By gathering this information and monitoring the 
repayment of the debt, they ensure some control over the firms and resolve the private incentive 
problem related to monitoring by small individual lenders. As such, bank monitoring represents an 
important corporate governance mechanism and contributes to better access and lower financing costs. 
This is particularly the case with small and medium-sized enterprises, which have available fewer 
assets that can be put up as collateral (Gelauff et al., 1996). Banks can in fact gather information 
beyond the hard information available to other investors. Information is gathered through contacts 
with the firms, their owners, the local community, from the provision of earlier loans, from contacts 
with the borrowers’ business partners etc. (Berger and Udell, 2002:37). Bank access to this ‘detailed’ 
information about the firm increases with the length and exclusivity of the bank-firm relationship, 
namely the establishment of ‘informed’ relations.14  
 
The strength of the bank-borrower relationships normally results in a variety of positive effects for the 
firm such as lower loan interest rates, reduced collateral requirements, less dependence on trade debt, 
increased credit availability etc. (Berger and Udell, 2002). However, a fundamental consequence of 
this asymmetric information and the bank’s ‘preferential’ access to it is that it yields an ex post 
monopoly power even when the banks are ex ante competitive. To put it differently, it provides the 
banks with some bargaining power over the firm’s surplus, which can result in firms having less of an 
incentive to exert effort (Rajan, 1992). Competition among potential financiers reduces the bank’s 
control over projects since uninformed lenders may continue unprofitable projects. Thus, firms may 
reduce this monopoly power by establishing links with more than one bank. The number of bank 
relationships should also increase with firm size since large firms’ needs for financing might quickly 
exceed the financing capacities of one bank and with the limited firm access to alternative sources of 
finance such as a bond or equity market. Multiple bank relationships also decrease the risk of losing a 
single bank relationship and thus the firm’s dependence on a single bank (Detraiche et al., 1997). We 
believe the former to be less likely when the single bank has alternative links with the firm such as 
participation in ownership or representation on the supervisory board. However, a firm’s reliance on 
many banks potentially reduces the bargaining power and ability of the single (main) bank to exercise 
(exclusive) control over the firm’s managers and, consequently, the availability of credit provided by 
the main bank (Ongena and Smith, 2000:27; Petersen and Rajan, 1994). The latter may be more 
important in poorly performing firms that, due to a poor performance history, find it more difficult to 
convey information about future prospects to other banks. Similarly, single banks are more likely to 
extract rents from firms with high financial burdens since the latter largely lose some of their 
bargaining power. We would also expect to observe a lower number of bank relationships in firms 
with a lower number of fixed assets that could be used as collateral. The financing requirement may 
also vary across industries since certain industries, such as manufacturing, may need more substantial 
outside financing than others. Thus, when choosing the number of banks to do business with firms 
somehow weigh up between the benefits and costs of multiple bank relationships. The decision 
depends on the relative bargaining power of the different sources and the revelation of information 
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(Rajan, 1992:1369). The latter, we believe, is largely influenced by the features of the financial sector 
and the institutional environment in which firms and banks operate. In fact, the highest number of 
firm-bank relationships is reported for countries with poor investor protection and a limited role of 
capital markets in firm financing such as Italy, Portugal, France, Belgium and Spain (Ongena and 
Smith, 2000).  
 
4. Slovenian banks and corporate financing – analysis of survey data 
 
The empirical analysis of the factors determining bank-borrower relationships in Slovenia is based on 
a sample of 121 small and medium-sized firms. The panel refers to the 1998-2002 period, namely the 
first four years following the conclusion of the banking sector’s reorganization in Slovenia. Data on 
the ownership structure (aggregate ownership stakes by different investor groups), the composition of 
the supervisory board, the number of bank relationships and the other variables describing firm 
relations with banks were obtained from questionnaires sent to over 623 Slovenian firms with shares 
registered in the Shareholders Register of the Central Securities Clearing Corporation (161 responses 
were obtained, including 121 responses from small and medium-sized firms). Data on the firms’ 
financial performance come from the Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for public legal records and 
related services.  
 
The inclusion of the explanatory variables in part follows the theoretical predictions and existing 
empirical evidence from developed countries. In addition, we try to measure the firms’ and banks’ 
bargaining power by addressing the firms through the questionnaires. This is a novelty in comparison 
to existing empirical papers. First, we directly ask the firm managers to evaluate (using a Likert scale 
from 1-no influence; 5-important influence) the banks’ influence on firm operations and decision-
making (BANK INFLUENCE). Similarly, the banks’ importance for firm financing is evaluated 
relative to managers’ responses concerning the importance of the following factors for firm 
investments and growth: growth: i) the relationships with banks; ii) access to domestic bank loans; iii) 
the interest burden or, better, the costs of bank financing; iv) access to outside investors’ financing; iv) 
and access to foreign bank loans. Using the responses we obtained we construct a composed variable 
which captures the importance of the costs of bank financing, access and relations with local banks 
(ROLE OF BANK FINANCING). The variables measuring the importance of foreign bank loans and 
outside investor financing enter into the regression separately. Similarly to other studies, we control 
for firm size, measured with the value of logarithm of total sales (TOTAL SALES). The possibility of a 
loss of the bank relationship is approximated by the presence of a banker on the supervisory board 
(BANKER ON BOARD). The existing financial leverage is measured alternatively by the percentage of 
interest payments in total sales (INTEREST BURDEN) and the percentage of firm long-tem debt in 
total assets (LDEBT TO ASSETS; in logarithms). We further control for firm performance 
(EBITDA/ASSETS), age (AGE) and industry (RETAIL, SERVICE and MANUFACTURING). In order 
to capture the specifics of banking in transition, we control for the availability of assets for collateral, 
measured by the size of fixed assets (FIXED ASSETS, in logarithms) and the ownership structure 
(percentage of inside ownership15). 
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Since the dependent variable (see Table 4) is truncated at 1, ordinary least squares could produce 
biased estimates. Following Green (2003), we rely on the Tobit specification, which is effectively a 
hybrid between a standard regression model and a binary choice model. The selected16 results with the 
corresponding marginal effects at the mean values of the explanatory variables and OLS regressions 
are presented in Table 6 below. In all cases the dependent variable is the average number of bank 
relationships over the 1998-2002 period as reported by the firms. 
 
Table 6: Firm-level Tobit Regression - dependent variable: number of bank relationships  
 (1) (1)Slope# (1) OLS## (2) (2) Slope# (2) OLS## 
Constant -14.489*** -11.207 -9.929*** -10.303*** -8.335 -8.058*** 
Banker on board -0.788*** -0.564 -0.643*** -1.093*** -0.804 -0.865 
Role of bank 
financing17
0.700*** 0.541 0.442***    
Access to foreign 
bank financing 
0.061 -0.036 0.058    
Access to investor 
capital 
-0.047 0.047 -0.078    
Bank influence 0.337*** 0.260 0.318*** 0.307*** 0.248 0.302 
EBITDA/assets -0.026** -0.020 -0.146* -0.026** -0.185 0.126 
LDEBT to assets    0.222*** 0.178  
Burden 0.096* 0.074 0.044    
Total sales (ln) 0.457** 0.353 0.332** 0.405*** 0.327 0.329* 
Fixed assets (ln) 0.514*** 0.398 0.422*** 0.049*** 0.397 0.426*** 
Age -0.01** -0.007 -0.01*** -0.015*** -0.011 -0.014*** 
Retail  0.096 0.075 0.075 -0.155 -0.123 -0.068 
Services (4) 0.3 0.238 0.258 -0.04 -0.032 -0.014 
Manufacturing (6) 0.283 0.222 0.074 0.035 0.029 -0.024 
Number  
of observations 
385  385 327  327 
Pseudo – R2 0.14  Adj R2=0.38 0.11  Adj R2=0.35 
LR test stat. 194.10***  F=16.83*** 132.30***  F=13.43*** 
Note: significance levels are: 1% (***), 5% (**) and 10% (*) 
Legend: # for dummy variables, the marginal change is for the discrete change of the X variable from 0 to 1 
## Pooled regression 
 
The results of the empirical analysis suggest some efficiency in the firms’ choices of the number of 
bank relationships: firms do seem to make a trade off between the benefits of ‘informed’ debt and 
bank bargaining power. There is in fact significant evidence that stronger reliance on domestic bank 
financing leads to a higher number of bank relationships (ROLE OF BANK FINANCING). Similarly, 
the banks’ stronger influence on firm decision-making (BANK INFLUENCE), which also implies the 
banks’ stronger bargaining power, significantly increases the likelihood of multiple relationships. 
Consistently with the limited importance of foreign bank financing, any eventual access to foreign 
bank financing does not effectively result in multiple bank relationships. Also in line with the 
expectations and the observations of other empirical studies is the impact of other firm-specific 
variables: larger and more indebted firms (see the variable BURDEN and LDEBT TO ASSETS) tend to 
have a higher number of bank relationships. Firms with a poor financial performance find it harder to 
make links with new banks. Older firms on average have a lower number of relationships; this may be 
due to the fact that firm age actually reflects a firm’s reputation and, hence, greater potential to access 
alternative sources of financing as well as the presence of stronger bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
banks. The presence of a banker on board, on the other hand, results in a lower number of bank 
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relationships. As already argued, this might be because bank involvement on the board represents a 
long-term bank engagement and reduces the risk of the latter losing the existing bank relationships. 
This conclusion if further enforced by the positive and significant relationship between the size of the 
bank ownership share in the firm and their presence on the supervisory board (correl. coeff. = 0.41). 
 
5. Conclusions 
 
Despite the differences in the chosen privatization programs and methods of financial sector 
restructuring and development, financial sectors in advanced transition countries share some similar 
characteristics: the limited role of capital markets, concentrated ownership and control of the corporate 
sector, the (still) influential role of the state and pre-transition interest groups, a lack of transparency 
and poor enforcement of shareholder and creditor rights. While firms mostly rely on internal funds for 
financing their investments, banks provide the most important, although limited source of outside 
financing. The role of banks is particularly important with regard to the financing of small and 
medium-sized firms, which are likely to be the subject to bigger information asymmetries and, 
consequently, higher costs of financing. In order to mitigate the latter, these firms build an exclusive 
long-term relationship with a single bank (relationship banking) that provides a substantial part of 
outside financing and other services. Apart from the benefits of single bank relationships, an exclusive 
firm-bank relationship provides banks with the power to expropriate some ‘private’ benefits from 
future firm projects. This is particularly the case in countries where the high concentration of the 
banking sector and limited firm access to alternative financing sources largely increase banks’ 
bargaining power when it comes to setting the terms of firm financing. In this regard, firms’ access to 
multiple banks represents an important vehicle for reducing the potential hold-up problem.  
 
For the sample of Slovenian SMEs we found that the number of bank relationships in the 1998-2002 
period reflected similar factors that generally influence bank-borrower relationships in more 
developed countries. However, the relatively low number of bank relationships, the limited role of 
foreign banks and capital market financing and the relevance of fixed assets (as guarantees) for firms’ 
access to banks most probably reflect the weaknesses of transition banking. Hence, we could expect 
that the number of firm bank relationships in Slovenia and other transition countries will grow along 
with the restructuring and privatization of the enterprise sector, with the adoption of good governance 
practices and improvements in the institutional environment in which banks and their clients operate.  
 
 
                                                 
Notes: 
 
1 The smallness of financial markets in transition countries can be attributed to the neglect of financial 
intermediation under communism, the low level of GDP per capita, the small size of the population of most 
countries and to the repeated cases of fraud and imprudent banking which led to significant financial losses by 
households and businesses (Fink et al., 1999:25). 
2 In fact, empirical evidence confirms that, although limited, bank financing for SMEs in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) mainly comes from local banks and less from state-owned banks, while foreign bank financing is 
almost negligible (Volz, 2004). 
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3 As argued by Berger and Udell (2002:49), shocks to the economic environment can significantly affect the 
contracting hierarchy and the propensity of banks to make relationship loans and, consequently, significantly 
impact on the supply of credit to small businesses. 
4 The restructuring of the two biggest state banks in Slovenia was officially concluded in June-July 1997. 
5 In the pre-transition period banks were exclusively owned by non-bank corporations, which were at the same 
time also the most important borrowers. Consequently lending decisions in banking firms were not based on 
prudential screening and monitoring activities but rather influenced by the borrowers’ interests, which eventually 
led to the unsound lending practices and to the accumulation of bad loans in banks’ assets. Sound credit 
evaluation practices began to develop to full extent in the beginning of the 1990s when the transition was 
commenced, but it took several years for banks to develop best practice credit assessment procedures common in 
western European banking. 
6 In 2003, small and medium-sized enterprises accounted for 99.7 percent of the total number of firms 
(entrepreneurs included) in Slovenia. SMEs employed 64 percent of all Slovenian employees; medium-sized 
firms (between 20-249 employees) provided employment to 21.4 percent of the employees (Slovenian Economic 
Outlook, 2006). 
7 According to the large bank and foreign bank hypothesis, foreign bank ownership and concentration of the 
banking sector would reduce the credit available to small and medium-sized enterprises since large (and non-
domestic) banks find it more difficult and have less incentive to gather information about opaque small business 
(Berger and Udell, 2002). 
8 According to the Development Report (Slovenian Economic Outlok, 2006), the level of net foreign direct 
investments in Slovenia in the 2000-2005 period amounted to 14.8 percent of GDP and was, as such, among the 
lower levels in Europe.  The level of foreign direct investment in Slovenia does not exceed the levels of any of 
the new EU member states.  
9 This is firms employing less than 500 employees. The number of employees was selected as a classification 
criteria for separating SMEs from rest of the firms. 
10 Limitations on bank credit exposure are part of bank prudential regulation and are incorporated in the Banking 
Act and subordinate decrees of the Bank of Slovenia as a banking sector regulatory body. In order to avoid 
excessive risk exposures to individual borrowers, banks need to closely follow so-called large exposures (i.e. 
total claims on individual borrowers exceeding 10% of bank capital). All large exposures need to be reported to 
the Bank of Slovenia and supervisory board of the banking firm needs to approve all the exposures that qualify 
as large exposures. The maximum allowed exposure to an individual customer must not exceed 25% of the bank 
capital (for customers related to the bank this proportion is set even lower at just 20% of bank capital). The total 
amount of all large exposures must not exceed 800% of the bank capital. 
11 In an environment with the poor protection of firm creditors, lending activity is riskier which should 
consequently result in a lower bank exposure to a single borrower (firm). The limited funding by a single (main) 
bank increases a firm’s need to establish a relationship with new banks and should, under certain conditions, 
result in a higher number of firm-bank relationships. According to the EBRD survey on the quality of 
investor/creditor protection, Slovenia is ranked in the lowest position between Central Eastern Europe and the 
Baltic states, with a particular weakness relating to disclosure and transparency (Transition Report, 2005). Rather 
than the legislation on the books, the main reason for the inefficiencies in the Slovenian institutional 
environment lies in the poor functioning of Slovenian courts: in fact, in Slovenia it takes two years to recover 
debt, the same length of time as in Colombia, Mozambique and Lebanon (Gregoric et al., 2007). 
12 This is Ongena and Smith (2000). 
13 With regard to small business lending, Berger and Udell (2002) stated the four main lending technologies: 
financial statement lending, asset-based lending, credit scoring, and relationship lending (p.36). 
14 For more on the benefits of informed bank relationship, see Diamond (1991).  
15 Inside ownership is the total percentage of shares owned by employees (managers), former employees and 
their relatives. 
16 We replicated the analysis by including additional control variables such as the ownership structure, the 
percentage of bank loans in total investments etc. The inclusion of these control variables did not alter the impact 
of the variables presented in regression models 1 and 2. Since their impact was not significant, the ‘extended’ 
regression models are not reported.   
17 Alternatively, the importance of bank financing was measured by the average percentage of bank loans in total 
firm investments during 1988-2002. The impact of the variable turned out to be positive but not significant. 
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